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ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF MARINE CORPS M1A1 






The M1A1 Abram’s Main Battle Tank (MBT) is expected to remain a key piece of 
USMC equipment beyond 2025.  Because the majority of equipment life-cycle costs 
occur in the operations and support phase, it is imperative that program managers 
incorporate effective and efficient product support strategies, balancing costs and 
reliability to create value for the government. The purpose of this project is to determine 
the effects of age, as measured by the time since the last depot-level rebuild, on 
equipment operational availability for the M1A1 MBT in the Marine Corps.  Our study 
includes an overview of the history of M1A1 development, Department of Defense 
materiel maintenance policy, M1A1 rebuild strategy, and prior M1A1 reliability studies. 
We reviewed depot- and unit-level maintenance records within the USMC’s System 
Operational Effectiveness database to establish a correlation between years since last 
rebuild and operational availability (Ao).  The objective of our research is to quantify the 
age-related effects on Ao to better inform the decision-making process of USMC 
leadership in determining materiel maintenance strategies. 
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In the Department of Defense (DOD), program (product) managers within the 
acquisition community have the responsibility to deliver required warfighter capabilities 
and sustain those capabilities through the product life cycle.  The operations and support 
(O&S) phase of the defense acquisition life-cycle management system represents the 
longest duration period of the weapon system life cycle and constitutes 60–70% of life-
cycle cost (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness [OUSD(L&MR)], 2011, p. 67).  The United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
M1A1 Abrams Tank entered the O&S phase in 1989 when initially fielded.  The M1A1 is 
expected to remain a key piece of USMC equipment beyond 2025, representing a 36-year 
time period within the O&S phase.  Because the majority of life-cycle costs occur in the 
O&S phase, it is imperative that program managers incorporate effective and efficient 
product support strategies balancing costs and reliability to create value for the 
government.   
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to determine the effects of age, as measured by the 
time since the last depot-level rebuild, on equipment operational availability for the 
M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) in the Marine Corps.  Our study includes an overview of 
the history of M1A1 development, DOD materiel maintenance policy, M1A1 rebuild 
strategy, and prior M1A1 reliability studies. We reviewed depot- and unit-level 
maintenance records within the USMC’s System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) 
database to establish a correlation between years since last rebuild and operational 
availability (Ao).  The objective of our research is to quantify the age-related effects on 
Ao to better inform the decision-making process of USMC leadership in determining 
materiel maintenance strategies. 
B. REPORT SUMMARY 
We collected qualitative data from DOD publications, Navy and Marine Corps 
publications, and documents supplied by the USMC M1A1 program office to describe 
 2 
the USMC’s M1A1 MBT rebuild and employment strategy.  We examined the M1A1 Ao 
using a six-year history, 2008–2013, from the USMC’s SOE application to acquire data 
on the M1A1, specifically the annual downtime and uptime per tank by serial number. 
This online application uses data from numerous USMC data sources in order to compile 
a comprehensive repository of operational effectiveness data regarding USMC weapons 
systems.  With this data, we calculated the average Ao by tank age through each of the six 
years of SOE data.  
We determined the correlation between operational availability and age in 
conjunction with calculating the average age of the tanks in our data pool.  This report 
defines age of a tank as the elapsed time since its last complete rebuild (LCR) at the 
Anniston Army Depot (ANAD).  In our analysis for this project, we used a simple linear 
regression model to determine a correlation between the dependent variable, Ao, and the 
explanatory variable, age.  This allowed us to determine the true significance of tank age 
as previously defined in relation to M1A1 availability to the USMC fleet. Based on our 
quantitative analysis, our model predicts that each tank will decrease in Ao by .0138 each 
year it gets older.   
Our regression model is a valuable tool that can be used to determine the link 
between age and Ao for the USMC M1A1 MBT fleet.  Our R-squared value of .743 
indicates that there is a fairly strong correlation between the age of the tanks and their Ao.  
This correlation does not mean age is the cause of the degradation in availability, rather, 
it is an indicator used to forecast availability. 
Applying the correlation between age and Ao, we conducted a what-if analysis 
comparing M1A1 fleet strength over time given different annual rebuild quantities.  In 
2013, the average age of the M1A1 fleet was 4.49 years, with the oldest tank being nine 
years since its last rebuild.  We used rebuild levels from 30 to 40 tanks per year and 
forecasted out to the year 2035, the expected life of the USMC M1A1. Given this 
constant process for rebuild, each level of rebuild reached an equilibrium state where the 
average age of the tanks remains constant.  This occurred between 2023 at 40 tanks per 
year and 2027 with 30 tanks per year.  At these rebuild levels, the most significant 
difference between Ao, again in 2027 between 40 tanks per year and 30 tanks per year, 
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was .0258 in 2027.    As a result, the net difference in average full mission capable 
(FMC) tanks based on Ao between these two rebuild levels is 2.32 FMC M1A1s in 2015 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The M1 series Main Battle Tank (MBT) is a key piece of equipment for the 
United States military in conducting offensive and defensive operations.  The Army M1 
MBT program dates back to the early 1970s with the XM1 tank and evolved into the 
M1A1 in the late 1980s with upgraded armor and 120 mm gun tube.  The USMC 
received its first units of M1A1 MBTs in 1989, and additional tanks were transferred to 
the USMC from the Army and Anniston Army Depot through 2008.  The following 
sections of this background chapter describe the acquisition and development history of 
the M1A1 MBT, the role and force structure of the M1A1 MBT within the USMC, an 
overview of USMC ground equipment maintenance, the DOD maintenance policy, and 
the USMC M1A1 rebuild program.  
A. M1A1 ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT HISTORY 
The Army’s M1 MBT program began in December 1971, leading to the award of 
two prototype development contracts in 1973.  The Army awarded one of the two 
contracts, valued at $68.1 million, to the defense division of the Chrysler Corporation 
(now General Dynamics Land Systems) and the other contract, valued at $88 million, to 
the Detroit Diesel Allison Division of the General Motors Corporation (Jane’s 
Information Group, 2013).  In February 1976, the Army accepted both prototypes for test 
and evaluation, and in November, the secretary of the Army announced that the Chrysler 
Corporation prototype had been selected for full-scale development and production 
(Jane’s Information Group, 2013).  By 1982, M1 tanks were in full-rate production at 
both the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant in Michigan and Lima Army Tank Plant in Ohio.  
Production facilities were initially operated by Chrysler, but in 1982 Chrysler sold its 
production subsidiary (Chrysler Defense Incorporated) to General Dynamics (Jane’s 
Information Group, 2013).    
The M1 tank program continued to evolve, receiving upgraded armor and a 120 
mm main gun, leading to the M1A1.  In 1987, the Army’s Tank–Automotive and 
Armaments Command (TACOM) issued a $3.5 billion multi-year contract to General 
 6 
Dynamics Land Systems to produce 3,299 M1A1 tanks (Jane’s Information Group, 
2013).  Production of the M1A1 ceased in April 1993, culminating with General 
Dynamics Land Systems producing a total of 4,796 M1A1 tanks at the Lima and Detroit 
tank plants (Jane’s Information Group, 2013).   
B. USMC AND THE M1A1 
In 1989, the USMC procured 221 M1A1 MBTs and received its first shipment of 
tanks in November 1989.  The USMC, in 1995, procured 50 additional tanks from 
Anniston Army Depot in Alabama.  While still at the Anniston Army Depot, all 50 tanks 
received a total of 62 modifications to match the configuration of the previously acquired 
221 M1A1 MBTs (Jane’s Information Group, 2013).  Also in 1995, the Army transferred 
an additional 132 M1A1 MBTs to the Marines, bringing the USMC on-hand allocation to 
403.  The USMC continued to modernize the M1A1 fleet with the firepower 
enhancement program (FEP), which consisted of thermal sights, imaging resolution, 
target range, and detection capability sight upgrades (Jane’s Information Group, 2013).  
By fiscal year (FY) 2009, the entire fleet received FEP upgrades.  In 2008, the USMC 
received an additional 44 M1A1 MBTs when each of the two active-duty tank battalions 
force structures increased by one additional tank company to respond to overseas 
contingency operation requirements (Jane’s Information Group, 2013). 1 
C. USMC M1A1 MISSION 
The M1A1 Abrams MBT was designed primarily as an offensive weapon but is 
also an effective defensive weapon system.  The mission of the M1A1 is to “close with 
and destroy the enemy by using armor-protected firepower, shock effect, and maneuver, 
and to provide anti-mechanized fire in support of the Marine division” (Headquarters 
United States Marine Corps [HQMC], 2005, p. 1-1).  Speed, mobility, armor-protective 
                                                 
1 Of the 44 M1A1 tanks received, 24 tanks equipped the additional tank companies and 16 were 
reserved as maintenance float vehicles.  Maintenance float vehicles are a pool of available assets that can 
be transferred to operational units when the operational unit has an unexpected decrease in readiness 
because of maintenance activities.  
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fire power, and shock effect are the core capabilities the MBT provides to the Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and ground combat element (GCE) commanders, 
ensuring superior combat power to achieve decisive results on the battlefield (HQMC, 
2005).  Figure 1 illustrates the main components of a M1A1 MBT, including location of 
military personnel.  Current specifications of the USMC M1A1 MBT are in Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Cutaway Drawing of M1A1 MBT Showing Position of Main 
Components (from Jane’s Information Group, 2013) 
D. D. USMC M1A1 FORCE STRUCTURE 
Currently, the USMC has a total force structure management system (TFSMS) 
approved acquisition objective (AAO) of 399 M1A1 MBTs and a depot float 
maintenance allowance (DFMA) of up to 43 M1A1 MBTs (TACOM, 2013).  The 
purpose of the DFMA is to ensure mission-essential equipment availability for 
operational forces while tanks are in transit to and from the depot (MARCORSYSCOM 
[PM Tank Systems], 2012).  Figure 2 depicts the normal rotation for an M1A1. 
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Figure 2.  Rotational Diagram of USMC M1A1 MBTs (from 
MARCORSYSCOM [PM Tank Systems], 2013) 
The priority after a tank is overhauled at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) is to 
send it to the maritime prepositioning force (MPF), which is identified by the number one 
in Figure 2.  According to the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (2013) website, the MPF 
“strategically places military equipment and supplies aboard ships located in key ocean 
areas to ensure rapid availability during a major theater war, a humanitarian operation or 
other contingency.” While on these preposition ships, the tanks have zero or minimal 
usage and sporadic visual inspections due to the limited storage area.  These tanks are on 
a ship for three to nine years before being transferred to an operational unit, which is 
identified by the number two in Figure 2.  While at the units, the tanks are utilized in 
accordance with the USMC M1A1 strategic mission.  Currently, the USMC rotates, on 
average, 40 M1A1 MBTs annually from operational units to the ANAD for a complete 
rebuild. Operational units then receive tanks from the MPF, if available, or newly rebuilt 
tanks from the ANAD.   
1 2 
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E. MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
DOD Directive 4151.18, Maintenance of Military Materiel (OUSD[L&MR], 
2004), provides overarching policy and guidance for executing DOD maintenance 
activities.  The OUSD is responsible for establishing DOD maintenance policy and 
guidance; however, the three service secretaries are directly responsible for equipping 
and maintaining their respective forces per 10 U.S.C. 3013 (Army), 10 U.S.C. 5013 
(Navy), and 10 U.S.C. 8013 (Air Force).  
Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN) 159, released March 26, 2013, 
established the USMC’s policy concerning the ground equipment maintenance program 
and instituted two levels of maintenance (LOM) known as “field” and “depot” (HQMC, 
2013).  Distinction between the two LOM are associated with the maintenance tasks and 
unit capabilities within each level.   
1. Field-Level Maintenance  
Field-level maintenance encompasses two echelons: organizational and 
intermediate.  According to USMC policy, units are not authorized to perform 
maintenance tasks beyond their equipment and manning capabilities.   
a. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
Organizational-level maintenance can be generally described as on-equipment 
maintenance. Organizational-level maintenance is conducted at the unit level by both the 
equipment operator and unit maintenance personnel, and is centered on preventive and 
corrective actions necessary to sustain equipment in a mission capable status.  
MARADMIN 581, released December 15, 2003, describes preventive and corrective 
maintenance actions, which include inventory, cleaning, inspecting, preserving, 
lubricating, adjusting, testing, and replacing parts and components with basic mechanic 
tool sets (HQMC, 2003).   
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b. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
Intermediate-level maintenance is shop-type maintenance to return equipment to a 
mission-capable status. Within the USMC, intermediate-level maintenance for the M1A1 
MBT is conducted beyond the unit level at one of the two active duty maintenance 
battalions.  MARADMIN 581 describes intermediate-level maintenance actions to 
include, but not be limited to, inspection, diagnosis, part or component replacement, 
precision machining, and welding, and also include calibration and repair of test, 
measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE).   
2. Depot-Level Maintenance 
The USMC utilizes depot-level maintenance activities to sustain military 
equipment throughout the equipment’s useful life cycle.  Title 10 U.S.C. § 2460 (2012) 
defines depot-level maintenance and repair: 
Material maintenance or repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or 
rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or subassemblies, and the testing and 
reclamation of equipment as necessary, regardless of the source of funds 
for the maintenance or repair or the location at which the maintenance or 
repair is performed. (§ 2460 (a))   
The USMC possesses two organic depot-level repair facilities, which are located at 
Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, GA, and MCLB Barstow, CA.  However, 
USMC organic depot-level capabilities are not used in support of the M1A1 MBT.  
Because of cost savings, the USMC stopped utilizing its depots at Albany and Barstow 
for M1A1 MBT rebuild and maintenance activities and shifted its depot-level workload 
to the ANAD in Alabama. Depot-level evacuation criteria for the M1A1 MBT was 
published in Technical Instruction (TI) 08953A-14/9, Enclosure 1, released in 1997 
(USMC, 1997).  M1A1 MBTs can be selected as a rebuild candidate based on the 
following criteria:  
 The hours of operation, months in active use (combat or other), equivalent 
full charge (EFC) rounds fired, and miles traveled enable commanders and 
logistics managers to predict when the M1A1 will become a candidate for 
the combat vehicle evacuation (CVE) program.  Thresholds for hours of 
operation, months in active service, and EFC are 3,000, 300, and 750, 
respectively. 
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 A candidate selected on the basis of “months in active use” will be 
qualified by a limited technical inspection (LTI) in accordance with 
current M1A1 inspection standards. 
 M1A1s meeting the EFC rounds fired criteria will be nominated for the 
CVE program regardless of LTI results. 
 When an LTI shows that an M1A1 requires repair beyond field-level 
capability, it will be reported as a candidate. 
 When an LTI shows that an M1A1 requires field-level repair but will 
require extensive man-hours or considered to be an economical drain on 
the using units operational budget to bring it back to a serviceable 
condition, this tank should be considered as a candidate for the CVE 
program. (USMC, 1997, p. 2) 
F. MATERIEL READINESS 
One of the most important metrics for measuring the success of major acquisition 
program within the DOD is materiel reliability.  All acquisition programs must have 
materiel availability as a key performance parameter (KPP)  and materiel reliability as a 
key system attribute (KSA), according to the OUSD(L&MR; 2012). These metrics, while 
important in developing requirements for a program, also translate to readiness reporting 
during the sustainment phase.  The USMC uses a simple formula to determine the 
materiel readiness (MR) rating percentage for a given unit: 
          
                                       
                    
 (1) 
 
In Equation 1, deadlined equipment is defined as equipment that is “not mission 
capable and cannot perform its designated combat mission due to the need for critical 
repairs,” according to the USMC (2012).   The PM Tank System office continuously 
monitors this metric to identify M1A1 readiness trends to better develop sustainment 
plans.   
G. RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
The intent of maintenance is to ensure that a piece of equipment is capable of 
performing its required mission or purpose. Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is 
an applied process to determine what actions must be performed to ensure equipment 
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continues to function as expected by the user (Moubray, 1997).  More specifically, the 
DOD defines RCM as “a logical, structured process used to determine the optimal failure 
management strategies for any system, based on system reliability characteristics and the 
intended operating context” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2012b, p. 25).   
RCM is a tool that can be applied throughout the equipment life cycle to assist 
decision-makers in determining cost-effective actions to promote maintenance efficiency 
and improve reliability.  Failure management strategies range from engineering change 
proposals (ECPs), preventive maintenance requirements, technical manual modifications, 
and training programs to full-blown overhaul or rebuild programs (OUSD[AT&L], 
2012b). The goal of RCM is not to reduce failures, but to identify and implement 
maintenance-related solutions that avoid or reduce the consequences of failures (United 
States Navy Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2013).   
H. RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE HISTORY 
In the 1950s, maintenance planning was centered on the notion that equipment 
had a useful life, which led to the concept of preventive maintenance (Moubray, 1997).  
Thus, preventive maintenance strategies, such as overhauls, at fixed intervals were 
considered essential to maintain equipment reliability (Moubray, 1997).  The airline 
industry in the 1960s performed periodic overhauls in its efforts to sustain the fleet but 
realized that its efforts were unsustainable (Nowlan & Heap, 1978).  As a result, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and commercial airline industry formed a 
maintenance steering group (MSG) committee to analyze preventive maintenance 
programs. The committee published a handbook on maintenance evaluation and program 
development, known as MSG-1, which was used to develop the maintenance program on 
Boeing’s 747 (Nowlan & Heap, 1978).  
In 1978, F. Stanley Nowlan and Howard F. Heap of United Airlines released 
Reliability-Centered Maintenance, which provided additional guidance and a systematic 
process to maintenance planning.  Nowlan and Heap (1978) found that scheduled 
periodic overhaul has little effect on overall reliability unless there is a dominant failure 
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mode present.  The DOD sponsored Nowlan and Heath in their research and has 
incorporated RCM principles and processes into policy since the early 1980s.  
The following time line describes the history of RCM evolution within DOD 
policy:  
 DOD Directive 4151.16, DOD Equipment Maintenance Program (1984), 
requires RCM to be used as the basis for establishing and sustaining 
preventive maintenance programs for all DOD equipment (p. 1). 
 DOD MIL-STD-2173(AS), Reliability Centered Maintenance 
Requirements for Naval Aircraft, Weapon Systems and Support Equipment 
(1986), provides procedures for conducting RCM analysis (p. 1).  This 
publication supersedes MIL-HDBK-266(AS), published in 1981, which 
was one of the first DOD publications implementing RCM principles.  
 GAO Report No. GAO/NSIAD-93-163, Depot Maintenance: Requirement 
to Update Maintenance Analyses Should Be Modified (1993), stated that 
military official believe “performing or updating RCM analyses on 
operational systems with extensive maintenance histories was not cost-
effective because the analyses are expensive to perform and would not 
significantly reduce maintenance requirements” (p. 2). 
 The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) issued SAE JA1011, 
Evaluation Criteria for RCM Processes (1999), to serve as an industry 
standard to “evaluate any process that purports to be an RCM process, in 
order to determine whether it is a true RCM process” (p. 1). 
 SAE issued JA1012, A Guide to the RCM Standard (2002), which 
amplified and clarified key concepts and terms from SAE JA1011 (p. 1). 
SAE JA1011 and SAE JA1012 serve as industry standards in RCM that 
have shaped DOD RCM policy.  
 DOD Instruction 4151.22, Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) for 
Materiel Maintenance (OUSD[AT&L], 2007), establishes policy and 
guidance for the Military Departments and Defense Agencies for 
implementation of CBM
+ 
as an essential readiness enabler used in 
conjunction with RCM analysis (p. 1).  
 The HQMC issued MCO 4000.57A, Marine Corps Total Life Cycle 
Management (TLCM) of Ground Weapon Systems, Equipment and 
Materiel (2009), to incorporate RCM and CBM
+
 into sustainment 
strategies (p. 12).  
 DOD MIL-STD-3034, Reliability Centered Maintenance Process (2010), 
describes the methodology standard used for the determination of 
maintenance requirements (p. 1). 
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 OUSD[AT&L] released DOD Manual 4151.22-M, Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (2012b), which implements DOD Instruction 4151.22 and 
provides guidance for the RCM process to achieve reliability, restore 
reliability, and maintain performance characteristics for DOD materiel (p. 
1).  
I. DOD POLICY AND RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
DOD Instruction 4151.22, Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) for 
Materiel Maintenance (OUSD[AT&L], 2012a), and DOD Manual 4151.22-M, Reliability 
Centered Maintenance (OUSD[AT&L], 2012b), require RCM to be used as a logical 
decision process to ensure effective maintenance strategies are implemented.  As stated in 
DOD Manual 4151.22-M, “RCM provides the evidence of need for other CBM+ 
processes and technologies, such as health monitoring or prognostics” (OUSD[AT&L], 
2012b, p. 7).  DOD Instruction 4151.22 defines CBM+ as follows: 
CBM+ is the application and integration of appropriate processes, 
technologies, and knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the target 
availability, reliability, and operation and support costs of DOD systems 
and components across their life cycle. At its core, CBM+ is maintenance 
performed based on evidence of need, integrating RCM analysis with 
those enabling processes, technologies, and capabilities that enhance the 
readiness and maintenance effectiveness of DOD systems and 
components. CBM+ uses a systems engineering approach to collect data, 
enable analysis, and support the decision-making processes for system 
acquisition, modernization, sustainment, and operations. (OUSD[AT&L], 
2012a, p. 9). 
J. RELATED STUDIES  
Given the current economic and political environment, leaders in the DOD will 
have to rely on cost-effective strategies to sustain weapon system programs.  RCM and 
CBM+ support that decision-making process by implementing maintenance activities or 
strategies that both are cost effective and increase reliability.  Many people intuitively 
believe that the age of a physical asset, such as a vehicle, contributes to failure and 
increased maintenance cost to sustain reliability.  This belief that equipment age 
contributes to failure is also present in the military with military personnel’s concerns 
with how leaders will sustain vehicle fleets in a contracting fiscal budgetary environment 
(Dunn, 2013).   
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A few studies in the past sought to quantify the effect of age on failure rates or Ao. 
The RAND Corporation released a study in 2004, The Effects of Equipment Age on 
Mission Critical Failure Rates: A Study of M1 Tanks (Peltz, Colabella, Williams, & 
Boren, 2004), providing statistical analysis of the relationship between age and 
equipment failures.  The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology (OASA[AL&T]) sponsored this study to assist in the 
determination of recapitalization requirements to maintain a desired level of operational 
readiness (Peltz et al., 2004).   
Peltz et al. (2004) claimed that the “age of M1 tanks is a significant predictor of 
non-mission capable failures, as are location and usage, and age is positively correlated 
with M1 failure rates” (p. xvii). The results from the study support their primary 
hypothesis that “M1 age has a positive log-linear effect portraying a 5 ± 2 percent 
increase in failures per year of age.  Thus, a 14 year-old tank will have double the 
expected failures of a new tank” (Peltz et al., 2004, p. xv).  Additionally, “once tank age 
reaches a certain point, the maintenance system may no longer be able to supply a 
satisfactory level of operational readiness” (p. xviii).  Their claim is based on the 
reasoning that organizations such as Fort Riley units, with the oldest tanks in the Army’s 
inventory, are the only active units that consistently struggle to meet the Army’s 
operational readiness (OR) rate goal for tanks (Peltz et al., 2004).   Based on monthly 
readiness reports extracted from the Logistics Information Database from 1999 to 2001, 
Fort Riley M1A1 OR averaged 88%, while the active force M1A1 averaged 91% (Peltz 
et al., 2004).  Peltz et al.’s (2004) research also concluded that  
while deployed to the Army’s National Training Center (NTC), tank 
battalions equipped with older M1A1s achieved less than 70% OR, which 
is considered the breakpoint for combat effectiveness.  In contrast, tank 
battalions with the newer M1A2 averaged 83% OR while operating at 
[National Training Center] NTC. (p. 6) 
The M1A1 MBT fleet in the USMC is expected to remain a critical combat 
support platform until 2035 or beyond.  The results of the RAND study support the idea 
that a rebuild strategy associated with the M1A1 MBT can improve readiness.  It is 
possible that the USMC may have to increase the time between rebuilds of the M1A1 
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fleet. As a result, concerns of age-related failures and their effects on reliability and 
readiness are surfacing.  Our analysis of the USMC M1A1 fleet is similar to that of the 
RAND study on M1A1 and M1A2 within the Army.  Our findings are comparable to 
results from the RAND study in our analysis of the USMC M1A1 fleet.  The purpose of 
our research is to quantify the age-related effects on Ao to better inform the decision-
making process of USMC leadership in determining materiel maintenance strategies.   
K. M1A1 MBT REBUILD PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, 
AND EXECUTION 
The USMC utilizes an enterprise level maintenance program (ELMP) to integrate 
and synchronize all stakeholders regarding depot-level maintenance for all ground 
weapons system and related materiel.  The guidance from the commandant of the USMC 
is that  
ELMP specifically addresses the Marine Corps’ readiness and budgetary 
challenges by providing more precise, definitive and defensible depot 
maintenance requirements and budgets, improved repair efficiencies and 
sustained readiness for essential weapon system assets supporting critical 
missions. (USMC, 2012) 
The USMC uses this program to ensure that its limited resources, mainly funding, are 
used to optimize the depot-level maintenance for Corps-wide ground equipment 
readiness.  The M1A1 MBT rebuild process falls under the ELMP umbrella for planning, 
programing, budgeting, and execution (PPBE).  Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM), specifically, the PM Tank Systems office, is integral in 
developing the long-term M1A1 MBT equipment condition plan and ensuring the depot 
level maintenance requirements are incorporated in the ELMP according to the USMC 
(2012).  PM Tank Systems ensures operational requirements are met by developing a 
M1A1 MBT rebuild strategy to maintain the requisite equipment Ao.  The budget for 
M1A1 MBT rebuilds is determined and allocated from the ELMP funds and at $1.5 
million per rebuild for FY 2014, the M1A1 is a significantly expensive ground-based 
weapon rebuild program in the USMC (TACOM, 2013).  Because of the funding for 
depot-level rebuilds being appropriated from ELMP funds, there are no costs to the 
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operational unit, freeing their operational maintenance budgets for day-to-day operational 
needs.     
L. ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT 
The ANAD, located in Anniston, AL, is the DOD center of industrial and 
technical excellence (CITE) for combat-tracked vehicles such as the M1A1 MBT.  As the 
CITE for combat-tracked vehicles, Anniston performs  
depot-level maintenance on vehicles ranging in size from the Stryker to 
the 70 ton M1 Abrams Tank and a variety of other types in between, like 
the M113 Family of Vehicles, the M88 Recovery Vehicle, and the M9 
Armored Combat Engineering vehicle. (ANAD, 2013b)  
The Army has used the ANAD for the production, maintenance, and overhaul of M1 
series family of vehicles since the late 1980s.  The ANAD has been a DOD pioneer in 
creating and using public-private partnerships with commercial defense industry leaders 
such as General Dynamics, Honeywell, and BAE (Army Materiel Command [AMC], 
2006).  According to § 2474, Title 10 U.S.C., depots can enter into public-private 
partnership arrangements related to their respective core maintenance competencies to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of operations and support, and enhance readiness by 
reducing equipment repair times. 
The ANAD is critical to the USMC sustainment efforts of the M1A1 MBT 
because of its extensive technical expertise and production capabilities.  A proportion, 
typically 10%, of the USMC M1A1 fleet, is rebuilt every year at the ANAD within the 
Nichols Industrial Complex.  The ANAD industrial complex is International Standards 
Organization  (ISO) 9001:2008 certified and has received the prestigious Shingo bronze 
award in 2007 for operational excellence in its rebuild process of the M1A1 Advanced 
Gas Turbine (AGT) 1500 horse power engine (ANAD, 2013a).  Based on current 
workload and production schedules, the ANAD is able to rebuild a USMC M1A1 MBT 
in 63 working days comprising 5,181 direct labor hours at an average unit cost of $1.5 
million, according to the cost estimate associated with the FY 2013 M1A1 Rebuild 
Statement of Work.  
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M. M1A1 MBT REBUILD STRATEGY 
Over the last decade of high operational tempo associated with the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the USMC has adjusted its M1A1 MBT rebuild strategy to meet its 
operational needs.  In the mid-2000s, this resulted in over 70 M1A1 MBTs rebuilt 
annually. At the end of the decade, as the wars began drawing down and new fiscal 
constraints began to impact the USMC, the rebuild strategy also changed.  Based on 
recommendations and guidance from the PM Tank System office, the M1A1 MBT 
rebuild strategy transitioned to a complete overhaul of all M1A1 MBTs in the USMC 
fleet over 10 years (MARCORSYSCOM [PM Tank Systems], 2013).  Given the current 
allowable strength of 399 tanks, 40 tanks per year are scheduled for rebuild at the ANAD 
prior to return to the fleet.  Tanks that are deployed in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom are not included in this number and are funded for rebuild with supplemental 
Overseas Contingency Operation funding. 
N. STATEMENT OF WORK FOR M1A1 REBUILD 
The ANAD is required to provide material, labor, facilities, missing parts, and 
repair parts necessary to rebuild, diagnose, restore, and test the M1A1 MBT to fulfill its 
requirements of the statement of work (SOW).  For the remainder of this study, rebuild is 
defined as follows:  
Maintenance technique to restore an item to a standard as near as possible 
to original or new condition in appearance, performance, and life 
expectancy … accomplished through a maintenance technique or complete 
disassembly of elements using original manufacturing tolerances and/or 
specifications and subsequent reassembly of the items. 
(MARCORSYSCOM [PM Tank Systems], 2012, p. 1)   
According to the SOW, dated September 4, 2012, the ANAD is responsible for restoring 
each M1A1 MBT inducted into the rebuild program to Condition Code “A”, regardless of 
the condition in which the M1A1 was received. 2  The M1A1 is considered a “new” zero-
                                                 
2 Condition Code “A” is defined as “serviceable/issuable without qualification, new, used, repaired, or 
reconditioned material which is serviceable and issuable to all customers without limitation or restriction, 
including materiel with more than six months shelf-life remaining” (MARCORSYSCOM [PM Tank 
Systems], 2012). 
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mile / zero-hour tank after rebuild activities are complete and a Condition Code “A” is 
issued.   
The M1A1 MBT rebuild process is separated into four phases: (1) pre-induction 
inspections; (2) rebuild; (3) inspection, testing, and final acceptance; and (4) packaging, 
handling, storage, and transportation (PHS&T).  Pre-induction inspection analysis is 
performed for each M1A1 MBT (within two weeks of receipt by depot) to identify any 
missing and unserviceable components.  If any non-expendable component or part is 
missing, the ANAD reports the discrepancy back to the relinquishing command. The 
relinquishing command is then responsible for correcting the discrepancy before the 
M1A1 enters the rebuild phase.  However, if the ANAD is able to correct the discrepancy 
with on-hand material, the ANAD updates its cost estimate and the relinquishing 
command is responsible for the additional cost (MARCORSYSCOM [PM Tank 
Systems], 2012). 
The rebuild phase consists of 18 steps occurring in nine different buildings within 
the industrial complex.  The first step of the rebuild process is to remove the turret and 
engine power plant from the hull. Once removed, the turret and engine power plant is 
transferred to additional buildings within the complex for further disassembly. Once each 
major section of the tank is completely disassembled, all component, assemblies, and 
sub-assemblies are inspected, repaired, refurbished, or replaced.   If new parts are needed, 
based on inspections after disassembly, parts are retrieved from the ANAD supply point 
through an automated part retrieval system.  Upon completion of the rebuild process for 
each section of the tank, the turret and engine are married with the hull and the tank 
system is inspected, tested, and painted in preparation for final acceptance.  
Final inspection, testing, and acceptance occur in phase three of the rebuild 
process.  The ANAD is responsible for planning and preparing final inspections and 
testing, but execution is conducted jointly with USMC personnel from MCLB Albany 
and Blount Island Command.  Appendix B of the SOW outlines the approved limited 
technical inspection checklist used during joint inspections and acceptance.  Any 
deficiencies identified in final inspections are resolved prior to preparing vehicles for 
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shipment.  The ANAD is responsible for arranging transportation to the required delivery 
site; however, the USMC is responsible for all transportation costs. 
O. RELEVANCE OF M1A1 REBUILD PROGRAM TO DOD LOGISTICS 
CAPABILITY 
The USMC M1A1 rebuild strategy is significant to the ANAD and the DOD in 
sustaining a core level of competence and logistics capability. Section 2464 of Title 10 
U.S.C. provides, in part, that  
it is essential for the national defense that the DOD maintain a 
government-owned, government-operated logistics capability to ensure a 
ready and controlled source of technical competence and resources 
necessary to ensure effective and timely response to a mobilization, 
national defense contingency, and other emergency requirements. (2013, § 
2464, p. 1537) 
According to ANAD officials, the depot requires an annual workload of 1.6 million hours 
to sustain the highest level of core competency with the M1A1 weapon system.  Without 
the consistent demand to rebuild, on average, 40 UMSC M1A1 MBTs per year, the DOD 
would have to rely more heavily on foreign military sales agreements with Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, and Iraq to sustain the organic M1 industrial base.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we outline the methods by which we conducted our research.  
These methods include the database systems and means used in our data collection, the 
data collection questions we asked, and the actual processes used to analyze and interpret 
the USMC M1A1 MBT operational data. 
B. METHODS USED IN DATA COLLECTION 
1. Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data required for our research describes the USMC’s M1A1 MBT 
rebuild and employment strategy.  We collected this data from DOD publications, Navy 
and Marine Corps publications, and documents supplied by the Office of the USMC PM 
Tank Systems.  We also conducted onsite visits to the PM Tank Systems office and 
ANAD, where all USMC M1A1 rebuild operations take place.   
2. Quantitative Data 
To examine the M1A1 Ao, we used a six-year history, 2008–2013, from the 
USMC’s System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) application to acquire data on the 
M1A1, specifically the annual downtime and uptime per tank by serial number. The SOE 
application was developed by Alion’s Weapon Systems Technology Information 
Analysis Center (WSTIAC) to support the readiness and supportability needs of 
MARCOSYSCOM according to the Capabilities Assessment Support Center (CASC; 
2013).  This online application uses data from numerous USMC data sources in order to 
compile a comprehensive repository of operational effectiveness data regarding USMC 
weapons systems.  Data received from SOE includes all equipment repair orders (EROs), 
part requisitions, dead lining events, and Ao for all M1A1 MBTs in the USMC.  To 
compensate for known data integrity issues identified during the development of SOE, 
SOE developers made several assumptions, such as assuming no delays in data entry, and 
assuming serial numbers outside three to six alphanumeric characters were identified as 
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erroneous and were eliminated from summary data, according to the CASC (2013). See 
Appendix 2 for a complete list of assumptions used in data validation in the SOE 
application.  We also acquired an MS Excel spreadsheet maintained jointly by ANAD 
and the PM Tanks Systems office that tracked the tank rebuilds by serial number from 
2004 to 2013.  
C. DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS 
1. Tank Age 
In order to determine the correlation between Ao and age, we first needed to 
determine the age of the tanks in our data pool.  For our research, we defined the age of a 
tank as the elapsed time since its last complete rebuild (LCR) at the ANAD.  Only tanks, 
with which we could determine the age, as we’ve outlined here, are included in our data 
pool.  Additionally, because the earliest record of rebuild we have is 2004, the maximum 
age possible in our experiment is nine years, though we excluded the nine-year-old tanks, 
as explained later.  The age, as we have defined it, is not a representation of the age of all 
components because individual parts are replaced over time.  It is, however, an analysis 
tool used to measure time since rebuild for the purposes of our project.  This created a 
baseline due to the fact that every tank that leaves Anniston after rebuild is in the same 
condition and considered a zero-age, zero-miles tank, regardless of the condition it was in 
prior to the rebuild.  We did not include tanks overhauled under an “inspect and repair 
only as necessary” (IROAN) program or other contract.  Additionally, we exempted all 
zero-year tanks in our analysis because of the reduced operational time available that 
year, resulting in an age range of one to eight years of age for the tanks used in this 
research.   
2. Applicable USMC Regions 
The SOE application classifies each piece of equipment as belonging to a specific 
region, as defined by Table 1. 
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Table 1.   USMC Region Codes 
Region Description 
MIM001 I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA 
MIM002 II MEF, Camp Lejeune, NC 
MIM003 III MEF Okinawa, JP 
MIM004 IV MEF Reserves 
MIM007 VII MEF Deployed Units 
MIM008 Bases, Posts, and Stations 
MIMMPS Maritime Prepositioned Fleet 
 
For our project, we limited our data pool to MIM001, MIM002, and MIM004 in 
order to standardize the type of unit examined.  These three regions contain the major 
tank battalions in the USMC.  Because a large amount of the USMC MBT fleet is 
encompassed in the MIMMPS region, we did not include it because of the lack of usage 
when assigned to the MPS.  While on these ships, the tanks have very minimal usage, if 
any.  We did not include the other regions because of lack of tanks assigned (MIM003), 
unusual operational tempo (MIM007), and minimal tanks assigned and special usage 
(MIM008).   
3. Operational Availability 
The primary goal for this research project was to determine the correlation 
between age and operational availability (Ao) of the USMC M1A1 MBTs.  The SOE 
application calculated the Ao of each tank using uptime and downtime due to dead lining 
events. With this data, we were able to calculate the average Ao by tank age through each 
of the six years of SOE data.  By using the average Ao by age, we created a weighted 
average that would compensate for having less data on older tanks when using regression 
to determine the correlation between age and Ao. 
4. Exclusion of Observations 
While reviewing the data collected for analysis, we determined that some 
observations would have to be excluded from the pool in order to ensure data quality.  
Tanks that were listed as down due to dead lining conditions for greater than half a year, 
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182 days, were assumed to be used to provide parts to other tanks (i.e., cannibalized).  
They therefore wouldn’t provide an accurate depiction of availability.    
In 2011, the USMC had 58 tanks overhauled at the ANAD using a separate 
contract following an IROAN program.  Because this doesn’t qualify as a complete 
rebuild and significantly differentiates these tanks from the standard rebuilds, those 58 
tanks were excluded from our data pool beginning in 2011 but were counted prior, if 
applicable.   
We also noticed that the SOE database sometimes had multiple entries for a given 
serial number and year.  Duplicated entries were removed, while those with different 
information were eliminated using the following standards.  The first discriminator was 
downtime, the entry with the higher amount of downtime remained, while all subsequent 
entries were excluded.  If these values were the same for multiple entries, then the 
deadline EROs value was used to eliminate extra entries to ensure that each tank serial 
number was used only once per year in our data pool. 
Finally, we excluded the tanks that were nine years old for two main reasons.  The 
first reason is that the number of occurrences of this age group is only .5% of the total 
sample pool.  Commanders at the unit level decided which tanks were sent to rebuild, and 
the assumption is they would most likely send problematic tanks, not operational ones.  
Because of these two factors, we assumed that these tanks did not accurately represent 
the population of M1A1s in the fleet.  At the conclusion of all data exclusions, we 
narrowed 2,023 entries to 891 for use in our data pool. 
D. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
In our analysis for this project, we used a simple linear regression model in order 
to determine a correlation between the dependent variable, Ao, and the explanatory 
variable, age.  This allowed us to determine the true significance of tank age as 
previously defined in relation to M1A1 availability to the USMC fleet. 
We also conducted a what-if analysis for the number of tanks the USMC sends to 
the ANAD for rebuild each year.  We forecasted the average age of the USMC M1A1 
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fleet through 2035 given current and potential reduced rebuild levels to predict the 
average Ao in the fleet. 
E. SUMMARY 
In the first three chapters, we discussed the current USMC M1A1 MBT rebuild 
process, the force structure breakdown and flow of the USMC fleet, and the data used to 
conduct our project.  This laid a foundation of understanding of our research question and 
analysis.  In the final two chapters, we outline the analysis of our gathered data in order 
to answer our primary research question and provide valuable information to the PM 
Tank Systems office and other USMC decision-makers regarding the MBT rebuild 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the results of the analysis conducted during this project.  We 
focused on the correlation between operational availability (Ao) associated with dead 
lining criterion for the M1A1 MBT and elapsed time since last rebuild using historical 
operational data from the USMC.  We used a simple regression analysis to determine this 
correlation while also identifying its coefficient of determination.  Using this correlation, 
we conducted a what-if analysis to determine average Ao given various numbers of tanks 
rebuilt each year. We combined the correlation between age and Ao with the forecasted 
age of the USMC M1A1 fleet at current and potential reduced rebuild levels.   
B. M1A1 OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY BY AGE 
1. Overview 
The USMC M1A1 fleet rebuild program transfers tanks from the operational fleet 
to the ANAD and, regardless of age and condition, rebuilds them to what is considered a 
zero-miles, zero-years tank.  A common indicator used in evaluating the status of a fleet 
of equipment is age.  This metric is easily obtained and an accurate indicator of Ao; 
therefore, it can be a powerful tool for strategic decision-makers.  The purpose of this 
section is to define the correlation between age and Ao for the USMC M1A1 fleet.  
2. Data Collection 
We collected operational data on the USMC M1A1 MBT using the SOE database 
over a six-year period, 2008–2013.  This data included the uptime and downtime for each 
tank in relation to dead lining events and the year in which they occurred. Additionally, 
we received M1A1 rebuild information from the Tank Systems program office.  At the 
conclusion of the data exclusion, we had a final sample of 891 USMC M1A1 annual data 
points.   
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3. Age of Tanks 
For this project, some tanks are counted up to six times, once for each year 2008–
2013 from the SOE database.  In each case, as the year advances, the tank’s age also 
advances; so multiple uses of tanks occur.  The formula to determine the age in relation 
to last rebuild is 
 Age = Year – LCR (2)  
Year: the year of data measured is SOE 
LCR: year of last complete rebuild 
 
Through applying this formula, our sample resulted in the below distribution, with 
regional breakdown, of tank ages.  The average age of the tanks in our sample of 891 
occurrences was 3.26 years since last rebuild, see Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  M1A1 Data Pool Age Histogram 
4. Operational Availability 
The SOE database compiled and calculated the Ao of each tank using Equation 3. 
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We did not use the other uptimes and downtimes because these data points include supply 
requisitions in their calculations, not just mission capability.  We then examined this Ao 
to determine whether a correlation with age existed.  
5. Age and Operational Availability Correlation 
For our project, we combined the average Ao for each age of tanks, one to eight 
years.  These averages are displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Compiled Tank Data 
 
To find the correlation between the age of the tanks and the Ao, we used a simple 
linear regression tool in MS Excel 2010.  Our regression yielded a coefficient of 
determination, or R-squared, value of .743.  We used Ao as the dependent variable and 
age as the explanatory variable, using the data from Table 2, resulting in a negative 
correlation between age and Ao (see Figure 4). 
I MEF II MEF IV MEF
1 144 86 31 27 100 45512 2448 0.948957465
2 206 106 51 49 173 66531 3748 0.946669702
3 185 103 46 36 222 59987 5481 0.916279709
4 139 76 39 24 171 43146 5587 0.885354893
5 113 54 15 44 127 31456 4105 0.884564551
6 70 3 56 11 55 16493 1370 0.923305156
7 19 10 4 5 14 4264 715 0.856396867
8 15 1 0 14 27 4052 743 0.845046924
Totals 891 439 242 210
Regions
TanksAge ERO (Deadline) Ao (Deadline)Downtime (Deadline)Uptime(Deadline)
 30 
 
Figure 4.  Operational Availability by Age 
Based on this simple linear regression, the equation to determine the Ao of a tank given 
the time since its last complete rebuild is 
 AO = -0.0138 x Age + .9629 (4) 
 
Given our assumptions, this equation predicts that each tank will decrease in Ao by .0138 
each year it gets older.  
6. Analysis  
Our regression model is a valuable tool that can be used to determine the link 
between age and Ao for the USMC M1A1 MBT fleet.  Our R-squared value of .743 
indicates there is a fairly strong correlation between the age of the tanks and their 
operational availability.  This correlation does not mean age is the cause of the 
degradation in availability, rather, it is an indicator used to forecast availability.  Our 
results, when compared to a similar report done by the RAND Corporation, share some 
similarities.  Although the RAND study (Peltz et al., 2004, p. xv) included factors other 
than age, used a negative binomial regression, and looked at the number of mean failures 
as opposed to Ao, both studies show a negative correlation between age and operational 





























RAND study showed mean failures, which contribute to a reduction in Ao, grew at a rate 
of 5 ± 2 % compounded annually (Peltz et al., 2004, p. xv).  The RAND study also used 
Army tanks, which conduct depot-level maintenance at the ANAD but do not conduct 
complete rebuilds like the USMC, and thus, used manufacture date to determine age.   
C. WHAT-IF ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
Over the past decade, the USMC has fluctuated in the annual quantity of tanks 
rebuilt, surging when necessary, to over 70 tanks in a single year. Currently, the USMC is 
using 10% of the AAO, or 40 tanks per year as the rebuild level.  As combat operations 
and funding decrease, rebuild quantities are highly scrutinized to ensure proper use of 
limited resources.  Given the correlation between age and Ao, the purpose of this section 
is to compare fleet strength over time given different annual rebuild quantities. 
2. Data Collection 
We started with 450 tanks tracked by the USMC in 2013, including Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), MPS, DFMA, and non-MEF assignments.  We also used the 
rebuild spreadsheet used by the ANAD and the PM Tank Systems office to determine the 
most recent rebuild for each of the 450 tanks to forecast the average age of the fleet over 
time given different rebuild levels.  Although we excluded the tanks that were part of the 
IROAN contract in 2011 for the correlation calculations, we classified them as rebuilt 
that year for the purposes of this section’s forecasting. 
3. Average Age Forecast 
In order to calculate the average age over time given the different rebuild levels, 
we first defined the current age of the USMC fleet.  Using Equation 2 from the previous 
section, we measured the elapsed time in years since each tank’s last complete rebuild or 
IROAN maintenance. See Figure 5.   
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Figure 5.  Quantity of Tanks by Age in 2013   
In 2013, the average age of the fleet was 4.49 years, with the oldest tank being 
nine years since its last rebuild.   
In order to forecast the average age of the USMC M1A1 fleet, given the 2013 
levels, we applied one assumption about how the tanks would be selected for rebuild.  
We assumed that each year, the oldest tanks were selected for rebuild, regardless of 
rebuild level.  For example, if 40 tanks are sent to ANAD for rebuild each year, then each 
year the 40 oldest tanks in the USMC fleet were selected.  In reality, tanks are selected by 
operational commanders using their own criteria combined with guidance from 
MARCORSYSCOM and M1A1 depot-level evacuation criteria annotated in TI-08953A-
14/9.  We used rebuild levels from 30 to 40 tanks per year and forecasted out to the year 
2035, the expected life of the USMC M1A1. Given this constant process for rebuild, each 
level of rebuild reached an equilibrium state where the average age of the tanks remains 
constant.  These equilibriums occurred between 2023 at 40 tanks per year, and 2027 with 
30 tanks per year, as depicted in Figure 6.   
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Figure 6.  USMC M1A1 Forecasted Age Through 2035 by Rebuild Level  
Given the different rebuild levels of 30 and 40 tanks per year, over time, the 
maximum difference in the average age of tanks in the USMC fleet was 1.87 years and 
occurred in 2027.   
4. Combat Power Comparison 
Given the forecasted average age of the USMC M1A1 fleet and a linear 
relationship between age and Ao, we were able to calculate the average Ao of the USMC 
tank fleet through 2035.  We applied Equation 3, determined during our linear regression, 
to the average annual ages of tanks in order to determine the annual Ao per year by 




























































































































Figure 7.  USMC M1A1 Forecasted Ao Through 2035 by Rebuild Level  
Since the age of the tanks reached an equilibrium and the Ao shares a linear 
relationship with age, the Ao also reached equilibrium.  At these rebuild levels, the most 
significant difference between Ao, again in 2027 between 40 tanks per year and 30 tanks 
per year, was.0258 in 2027.  Using Equation 5, the net difference in average FMC tanks 
based on Ao between these two rebuild levels is 2.32 FMC M1A1s in 2015 and 10.28 
FMC M1A1s in 2027 at an AAO of 399 tanks. Conversely, increasing the number of 
tanks rebuilt per year by 10 could increase fleetwide FMC by almost eight tanks.  USMC 
decision-makers can use this relationship when determining depot support to optimize 
USMC capability given fiscal constraints. 












































D. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
Our analysis assumes a linear relationship between the dependent variable (Ao ) 
and the independent variable (age).  The range of the independent variable within our 
observations was from one to eight years of age.  Our regression model can explain 
approximately 74% of the variation in Ao based on age as the independent variable.  If 
our model were to be used to predict Ao based on M1A1 MBT age greater than eight 
years, the predicted results becomes increasingly inaccurate as age increases beyond eight 
years.  Additionally, our model considers tank age only to predict Ao and omits usage 
effects.  
Our study defines the age of a tank as the elapsed time between last complete 
rebuild at the ANAD.  In order to estimate the future average age of the M1A1 fleet, at 
various rebuild intervals, we assumed that the USMC would select the oldest tanks 
available for rebuild.  Generally, tanks should be considered a candidate for rebuild when 
operational usage exceed 30 months, 300 hours, 750 rounds fired, or 3000 miles traveled 
according to USMC Inspection and Evacuation Criteria for Tank, Combat, Full Tracked, 
120mm, M1A1 (USMC, 1997, p. 2).  Our assumption that the oldest available tanks will 
be chosen for rebuild is in line with USMC evacuation criteria; however, it is known that 
tanks are frequently selected based on reliability issues rather than age or usage.  Thus, 
our forecasted average age of the M1A1 fleet illustrates a best-case scenario achieving 
the lowest possible average age of the fleet, given that the oldest tanks are selected for 
rebuild.  If the USMC continues to select tanks for rebuild based on reliability rather than 
age, the actual average age of the fleet will increase, resulting in a likely increase in 
standard error between forecasted and actual Ao when utilizing our model.    
M1A1 tanks that were reported as non-mission capable for greater than 182 days 
due to dead-lining conditions were assumed to be cannibalized.  In this situation, 
cannibalization refers to removing functional parts from a non-mission capable tank to 
correct faults on other tank(s).  In general, cannibalization is a quick, short-term solution 
that has been viewed as a symptom of an inadequate supply chain resulting in spare part 
shortages (Curtin, 2001, p. 2).  According to Neal Curtin, Director, Defense Capabilities 
and Management, and his testimony to the Congress in 2001, as many as half of all 
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cannibalizations may go unreported (p. 4).  Unreported cannibalization may result in the 
“masking” of dead-lining events of other equipment, resulting in failures to be 
understated in SOE.  These unreported failures directly reduce the accuracy of our model, 
resulting in our forecasted Ao to be overstated.  The frequency of cannibalizations at the 
operational level was not included in our study, and the number of cannibalization 
occurrences and reason for cannibalization is considered to be unknown.  
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we used the data collected from the USMC to analyze the 
correlation between the elapsed time since last M1A1 rebuild and Ao.  We determined the 
current age of the USMC M1A1 fleet and forecasted the age out 20 years given various 
rebuild levels.  Finally, we combined the correlation and the forecasted age to determine 
the effect on combat power of reducing the number of tanks rebuilt annually.  In the next 
section, we make recommendations of information for decision-makers to consider when 




A. APPLICATION OF MODEL 
1. Depot-Maintenance Planning 
Our model is a tool that forecasts the effects of a change in age of USMC tanks 
and does not generate an optimal rebuild level for USMC M1A1s.  The linear model 
generated in our research can, however, aid USMC senior leadership in determining the 
required quantity of M1A1 tanks rebuilt each year to achieve a desired Ao.  At the 
strategic level, leaders will determine the required combat power of the M1A1 and use 
our average age forecast at various rebuild levels and linear equation, relating age to Ao 
to ensure that combat power is achieved given current M1A1 unit authorizations.  
Because the USMC consolidates depot-level maintenance planning using ELMP, this 
model can assist in trade off analysis to ensure that the USMC optimizes its use of limited 
resources.  If rebuild levels change annually, average age forecast must be redone to 
accommodate the variations prior to applying the linear model relating age to Ao. 
2. Tank-Deployment Selection 
The linear model linking the age of an USMC M1A1 tank to its Ao can also be 
used to assist military leaders in operational planning.  Rather than using a fleet-wide 
average Ao for the tanks used, leaders can apply our linear model to have a more realistic 
idea of the equipment availability throughout future operations.  Knowing a more 
accurate Ao will enable logisticians to plan and manage the logistical footprint required 
for the operation more efficiently, saving money and increasing availability.  This 
knowledge will also enable commanders at all levels to ensure they have a more realistic 
planning estimate of the combat power available throughout the duration of an operation.   
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our model clearly identifies a correlation between age and Ao of the USMC 
M1A1 tanks.  There are, however, other factors that can influence a tank’s availability 
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that could be explored in future research.  Examining usage, environment, and time spent 
on MPS ships could give a more accurate availability for the fleet.  Additionally, it could 
help optimize M1A1 distribution throughout the MEFs to ensure capabilities are uniform 
across the fleet.   
As modifications and improvements to the M1A1 Abrams continue, failures that 
require maintenance and reduce Ao should be examined to define trends.  Future research 
could focus on dead lining failures by tank subcomponents such as engine, turret, 
transmission, electronics, and weapons.  Identifying the most prevalent failures can 
optimize maintenance planning, engineering changes, and supply-chain management to 
improve Ao. 
The current rebuild strategy replaces all parts regardless of condition.  Although 
this assists in reducing the turnaround time for the rebuilds by cutting down inspection 
and process time, it may unnecessarily replace certain parts.  Further research might 
examine different methods for rebuild and depot maintenance, such as the use of an 
IROAN program, and compare them to the current strategy.   
Finally, further research could examine the cost transference caused by reduced 
annual rebuild levels.  Cost savings from sending fewer tanks to ANAD each year will be 
offset to some degree with increased maintenance required at the organizational level.  
This transference, coupled with projected operational availability using our model, would 
give senior decision-makers more information to make strategic sustainment decisions. 
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APPENDIX A. USMC M1A1 MBT SPECIFICATIONS 
Appendix A illustrates a summarized list of key M1A1 MBT specifications 
and characteristics that were retrieved from the M1A1 operators manual (TM 9-2350-
264-10-1).  
 
 M1A1 MBT 
Dimensions and weights   
   Crew: 4 
   Length   
      overall: 387.0 in 
      main gun rearward: 355.6 in 
   Width   
      overall: 143.75 in. ± 0.54 in 
      without skirts: 136.0 in 
   Height   
      to turret roof: 96.0 in 
      Maximum overall: 113.6 in 
   Ground clearance   
      hull: 19.0 in 
      hull sides: 17.0 in 
   Weight   
      MLC: 67 (w/ T-156 track); 68 (w/ T-158 track) 
Mobility   
   Configuration   
      running gear: tracked 
   Power-to-weight ratio: 23.77 hp/t 
   Speed   
      max speed: 41.5 mph 
   Range   
      main fuel supply: 264.7 miles 
   Fuel capacity   
      Total in all tanks: 504.4 US gallons 
   Fording   
      without preparation kit: 48.0 in 
      with preparation kit: Turret roof 
   Gradient: 60% (31.0°) 
   Side slope: 40% (22.0°) 
   Turning radius: 171.7 in 
   Engine: AGT 1500, 1,500 hp at 30,000 rpm  
   Gearbox   
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      model: Allison Transmission X-1100-3B 
      type: automatic 
      forward gears: 4 
      reverse gears: 2 
   Brakes   
      main: Hydraulic-mechanical service brake (foot) 
   Suspension: advanced torsion bar 
   Electrical system   
      vehicle: 24 V 
   Batteries: 6 × 12 V 
Firepower   
   Armament: 1 × turret mounted 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun 
1 × coaxial mounted 7.62 mm M240 machine gun 
1 × roof mounted 12.7 mm M2 HB machine gun 
1 × roof mounted 7.62 mm M240 machine gun 
12 × turret mounted smoke grenade launcher (2 × 6) 
 
 41 
APPENDIX B. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The summary options available within the SOE Decision Support Tool are based 
on data records obtained from numerous USMC data sources. Several assumptions were 
required to summarize these data records as numerous data integrity issues were 
identified during the development of the SOE Decision Support Tool. The following list 
identifies some of the more pertinent assumptions that were derived during the 
development of the various summary options within the SOE Decision Support Tool.  
  
1. All dates recorded in MIMMS and ATLASS II+ for 
Date_Received_In_Shop (DRIS) of an ERO, Date_Closed associated with 
an ERO, Date_Ordered associated with order of parts, and 
Date_Received_Cancelled associated with receipt of parts are assumed to 
be accurate (i.e., there is no delay in entering these dates into maintenance 
management systems). 
2. When determining equipment repair order (ERO) metrics in which parts 
were ordered or received outside of the “bookends” of the ERO (i.e., 
DRIS and Date_Closed), the dates coinciding to the order or receipt of 
these parts is shifted to coincide with the ERO “bookends.” But when 
determining the logistics response time (LRT) for these parts it is 
determined inconsequential of these ERO “bookends.” 
3. The criticality codes (CCs) from the APPS40 files are assumed to be 
accurate. Therefore, a CC of 5 represents a critical part and all other CCs 
are assumed to represent non-critical parts. 
4. The critical maintenance downtime (MDT) will be determined based on 
the days that the equipment was in a deadlined status, which will use data 
from the Deadline_Control_Date (DCD), Category_M_Days_Deadlined, 
and critical logistics response time (LRT) fields. 
5. The percentage of critical parts versus the total number of parts used 
within an ERO is used to calculate the critical active maintenance time 
(AMT) and subsequently the critical administrative delay time (ADT). 
Where critical AMT is equal to this percentage multiplied by total AMT 
for ERO. 
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6. The accuracy of labor hours tracking in the Military_Labor_Hours and 
Manhours 1, 2, and 3 are assumed to be valid in MIMMS and ATLASS 
II+. 
7. When converting Military_Labor_Hours or sum of Manhours 1, 2, and 3 
to days for the AMT calculation it is assumed that 8 hours is equal to 1 
day. 
8. It is assumed in the Weapon System Criticality and Parts Criticality 
summary options that the four factors that are used to determine the 
overall criticality of the weapon systems and parts should be equally 
weighted (i.e., 25% weighting per factor). Future versions of SOE 
Decision Support Tool may provide a capability to vary weighting factors 
for customizing specific program needs. 
9. Since item designator number (IDN) information is not collected within 
the ATLASS II+ maintenance management system there is no way to 
summarize this data by IDN for the various equipment operated in II MEF 
while ATLASS II+ was being utilized (i.e., Camp Lejeune, NC). 
Therefore, a new IDN (ATLASS) was created to summarize these data 
records by IDN. 
10. Serial numbers must be between 3 and 6 alphanumeric characters in 
length. All other serial numbers are assumed to be erroneous and are 
eliminated from data summarization. (Note: The SOE Decision Support 
Tool does not currently account for serial number “O” events in which 
multiple weapon systems are inducted into maintenance for a common 
event.) 
11. EROs with the same ERO number, region, and DRIS are assumed to be 
duplicates and are eliminated from consideration for data summarization. 
12. EROs in which the Date_Closed or DRIS (Julian date formatted as yyddd 
or 97001 for January 1, 1997) identify the day as 000 are assumed to be 
erroneous and are eliminated from consideration for data summarization. 
13. Dates for Date_Closed, DRIS, Date_Ordered, and 
Date_Received_Cancelled must be greater than 3 digits in length (i.e., 
acceptable Julian date formats are yddd or yyddd only). Data records that 
do not comply are assumed to be erroneous and are eliminated from 
consideration for data summarization 
14. EROs that have a Defect Code of “777” or “999” are assumed to be 
erroneous as these represent unsuccessful attempts to move TC-AIMS or 
ATLASS II+ data records into the MIMMS format. These EROs are 
eliminated from consideration for data summarization. 
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15. If the IDN field is <NULL> for a data record the record is eliminated from 
consideration for data summarization. 
16. The national stock number (NSN) must be 13 digits in length or the data 
record associated with NSN should be eliminated from consideration for 
data summarization. 
17. The federal supply class (FSC) is the first 4 digits of the NSN. If the FSC 
is “2540” or “4210” then the parts are assumed to be tools which are 
removed from consideration for data summarization. 
18. The national item identification number (NIIN) is the last 9 digits of the 
NSN. If the NIIN is equal to “511000000” or between “528100000” and 
“999999999” it is assumed to be a tool as well, thus eliminated from data 
summarization consideration. 
19. An exception has been made for SL-3 items so these items will not be 
summarized in criticality reports. SL-3 items will remain visible though, 
so their costs can be reviewed by users (i.e., PMs). 
20. If the Date_Received_Cancelled (date part received) occurs prior to the 
Date_Ordered (part order date) for a part the data record is assumed to be 
erroneous and removed from consideration for data summarization. 
21. If the Date_Received_Cancelled is equal to “9999” (in format of yddd) it 
is assumed to reflect a cancelled order and therefore is removed from data 
summarization consideration. 
22. The Region and Fleet summary options within the Maintainability Metrics 
section of the SOE Decision Support Tool eliminate data records in which 
the AMT>20 days from data summarization consideration. 
23. Year selection options refer to government fiscal year (i.e., October 1st 
through September 30th). 
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APPENDIX C. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS FIELD 
DEFINITIONS  
Appendix C provides a brief description of column fields within the SOE 
database.  The SOE database was the primary data source used in our analysis of 
operational availability.  The System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) user guide (2013), 
version 1.0.1.3, can provide more information regarding the functions and capabilities of 
the SOE database.  
 
Field Description 
Serial Number Unique identifier for each weapon system. 
EROs 
Number of equipment repair orders opened/closed for given Serial 
Number. 
EROs (critical) 
Number of critical equipment repair orders, EROs in which critical parts 
were maintained, opened/closed for given Serial Number. 
EROs (deadline) 
Number of deadlining equipment repair orders opened/closed for given 
Serial Number. 
Parts 
Total number of parts replaced for given Serial Number, based on 
National Stock Numbers (NSNs). 
Parts (critical) 
Total number of critical parts replaced for given Serial Number based on 
NSNs. Critical parts have a Criticality Code = 5. 
Unique 
Number of unique parts replaced for given Serial Number based on 
NSNs. 
Unique (critical) 
Number of unique critical parts replaced for given Serial Number based 
on NSNs. Critical parts have a Criticality Code = 5. 
Downtime 




Similar to Category_M_Days_Deadlined. Number of days the given 
Serial Number was in a deadlined status due to critical maintenance. 
Downtime 
(deadline) 
Number of days (usually Category_M_Days_Deadlined) the given Serial 
Number was in a deadlined status due to maintenance. 
Cost 
Price associated with parts required for maintenance of given Serial 
Number, which is taken from Supported Activities Supply System 
(SASSY) and/or Federal Logistics Data (FEDLOG). 
Cost (critical) 
Price associated with critical parts required for maintenance of given 
Serial Number, which is taken from SASSY/FEDLOG. 
MDBM 
Mean days between maintenance for given Serial Number based on 
number of days Serial Number was available for service (i.e., Uptime) 




Mean days between critical maintenance for given Serial Number based 
on number of days Serial Number was available for service (i.e., Uptime 
(critical)) divided by total EROs (critical) during specified period. 
MDBM 
(deadline) 
Mean days between deadlining maintenance for given Serial Number 
based on number of days Serial Number was available for service (i.e., 
Uptime (deadlining)) divided by total EROs (deadlining) during 
specified period. 
Avail. 
Availability of given Serial Number, a percentage of total time, is 
cumulative calendar time Serial Number could be available for service 
divided by time Serial Number was available for service 
(Uptime/(Uptime + Downtime)). 
Avail. (critical) 
Critical availability of given Serial Number, a percentage of total critical 
time, is cumulative critical calendar time Serial Number could be 
available for service divided by critical time Serial Number was 
available for service (Uptime (critical)/(Uptime (critical) + Downtime 
(critical)). 
Avail. (deadline) 
Deadlining availability of given Serial Number, a percentage of total 
deadlining time, is cumulative critical calendar time Serial Number 
could be available for service divided by deadlining time Serial Number 
was available for service (Uptime (deadlining)/(Uptime (deadlining) + 
Downtime (deadlining)). 
Uptime 
Number of days the given Serial Number was available for operation and 
not subject to maintenance. 
Uptime (critical) 
Number of days the given Serial Number was available for operation and 
not subject to critical maintenance. 
Uptime 
(deadline) 
Number of days the given Serial Number was available for operation and 
not subject to deadlining maintenance. 
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